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Note
Pretrial Hypnosis and its Effect on
Witness Competency in Criminal
Trials
State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981).
I. INTRODUCTION
The question of whether to admit the testimony of witnesses
hypnotized prior to trial1 in subsequent criminal proceedings has
been the source of much controversy in recent years. 2 In recogni-
tion of the apparent ability of witnesses to "remember" more while
under hypnosis, the 1970's brought a vast increase in the use of
hypnosis in criminal investigations.3 Due to this increase, courts
have been forced to evaluate the effect of the hypnosis when those
witnesses are subsequently called to testify at trial. Decisions on
the admissibility of such testimony have ranged from complete ad-
missibility,4 to limited admissibility,5 to complete exclusion. 6 Al-
though the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony is not
1. Only one known American case had allowed hypnotism in court. In that case
the defendant was hypnotized out of the presence of the jury and questioned
by the prosecuting attorney. As a result, the charge against the defendant
was reduced from murder to manslaughter. State v. Nebb, No. 39,540 (Ohio
C.P., Franklin Co., May 28, 1962). For a complete discussion of this case, see
Herman, The Use of Hypno-Induced Statements in Criminal Cases, 25 Omo
ST. LJ. 1, 4 (1964).
2. See infra notes 4-6.
3. See Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospec-
tive Witness, 68 CAL. U Rav. 313 (1980); Reiser, Hypnosis as a Tool in Crimi-
nal Investigation, POUCE CHEF 36 (Nov. 1976); Worthington, The Use in Court
of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony, 27 INTL J. CLnINCAL & EXPERMENTAL
HYPNOsis 402, 403 (1979) (reporting that in 1975 the Los Angeles Police De-
partment implemented a program responsible for training nearly 300 people,
primarily police officers, in the use of hypnosis).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
885 (1979); United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1006 (1978); Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); People
v. Smrekar, 68 IM. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979); Harding v. State, 5 Md.
App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969); State v. Mc-
Queen, 395 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 492
P.2d 312 (1971); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982).
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a new question,7 the courts of many states are only now being
faced with the issue8 and others have yet to address it.
The Nebraska Supreme Court dealt with the admissibility of
hypnotically influenced testimony in State v. Palmer, 9 which was
handed down in December, 1981. In Palmer, the appellant argued
that the pretrial hypnosis of certain prosecutorial witnesses ren-
dered their testimony unreliable and therefore it should have been
suppressed.1O The court consulted several recent decisions from
other jurisdictions on the admissibility of hypnotically influenced
testimony and decided that those cases which held such testimony
inadmissible presented the best rule. Thus the court held that un-
til it is generally accepted by experts that hypnosis can accurately
improve memory, a witness who has been questioned under hyp-
nosis prior to trial, may not testify in a subsequent criminal pro-
5. See State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M.
682, 643 P.2d 246 (1981); State v. Long, 32 Wash. App. 732, 649 P.2d 845 (1982).
6. See, e.g., State v. LaMountain, 128 Ariz. 547, 611 P.2d 551 (1980); State v. Mena,
128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775,
181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982); Strong v. State,- Ind. -, 435 N.E.2d 969 (1982); Col-
lins v. State, 62 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272 (1982); People v. Gonzales, 108
Mich. App. 145, 310 N.W.2d 306 (1981); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn.
1980); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981).
7. The first American case to consider the admissibility of testimony by a previ-
ously hypnotized witness was State v. Exum, 138 N.C. 599, 50 S.E. 283 (1905).
In that case, the court viewed evidence of hypnosis as affecting the credibility
of the witness and ruled that inquiry as to whether the witness had been
hypnotized was permissible on cross-examination.
8. Many of the recent decisions on the admissibility of hypnotically influenced
testimony are cases of first impression. See, e.g., Strong v. State, - Ind. -,
435 N.E.2d 969 (1982); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (1981); State
v. Long, 32 Wash. App. 732, 649 P.2d 845 (1982); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d
1280 (Wyo. 1982).
9. 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981). While this Note was in the advanced
stages of publication, the Nebraska Supreme Court decided State v. Patter-
son, 213 Neb. 686, - N.W2d - (1983), and State v. Levering, 213 Neb. 715, -
N.W.2d - (1983). These cases modify the position taken in State v. Palmer,
210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W. 2d 648 (1981), regarding the extent of witness incompe-
tency. In Patterson and Levering, the court essentially adopted the position
of limited competency suggested in this Note. However, the court based this
modification on similar changes in other states and failed to take advantage
of the opportunity to ground its hypnosis analysis in the Nebraska Rules of
Evidence which would have been the sound (and seemingly required) ap-
proach. See infra note 125. Notwithstanding these decisions, it is the aim of
this Note to provide a helpful analysis for other jurisdictions and legal schol-
ars who have yet to resolve questions concerning the admissibility of hypnot-
ically influenced testimony.
10. Id. at 212, 313 N.W.2d at 652. The appellant also challenged the legality of his
warrantless arrest in Texas. The court, noting that the legality of an arrest is
governed by the law where the arrest takes place, found that a valid warrant-
less arrest had been made under the law of Texas. Id. The arrest issue will
not be discussed in this Note.
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ceeding regarding those matters covered in the hypnotic session. 1
The case was then remanded to the district court.'2
Although the holding of Palmer appears to provide a clear rule,
it does leave several questions unanswered as is indicated by the
fact that the case is again pending before the court on appeal.' 3
The reasoning of the court in reaching its decision is also some-
what lacking. The purpose of this Note is to analyze and evaluate
State v. Palmer14 in light of the decisions of other jurisdictions
dealing with the admissibility of hypnotically influenced testimony
as well as the current scientific and legal literature on this issue.
First, the existing case law on hypnosis and hypnotically influ-
enced testimony will be examined. Second, the Palmer decision
itself will be compared and analyzed. Finally, modifications and
clarifications of the position taken in Palmer, and other recent de-
cisions in accord with Palmer, will be suggested.
H. THE CASE LAW
The art, or science, of hypnosis began centuries ago' 5 and has
long been shrouded with an aura of mystery and evil. The Ameri-
can legal system has traditionally viewed hypnotism with a large
degree of skepticism.' 6 The first American case to consider hypno-
sis was the 1897 case of People v. Ebanks.17 In Ebanks, when con-
fronted with a witness who proposed to testify to what the
defendant had told him while under hypnosis, the court simply
stated that "the law of the United States does not recognize hypno-
tism"' 8 and refused to admit the testimony. 9 State v. Exum20 is
11. State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 218, 313 N.W.2d 648, 655 (1981).
12. A motion for rehearing by the State was overruled February 17, 1982. The
mandate remanding the case to the District Court of Hall County was issued
February 18, 1982.
13. On remand, the district court allowed the witness to testify to those events
recalled prior to hypnosis and to identify the appellant and his wife, reason-
ing that the Supreme Court had not meant to preclude that limited amount of
testimony. Palmer has appealed this decision and the case is now pending
before the Supreme Court. The court heard oral arguments on May 2, 1983.
14. 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981).
15. Modem hypnotism originated in the 18th century with the work of Dr. Franz
Anton Mesmer, a Viennese physician. Mesmer believed a type of animal
magnetism emanated from his hands and produced hypnotic effects. Contro-
versy has surrounded hypnotism ever since the days of Mesmer. E. HI.GARD,
EXPERIENCE OF HYPNOSIs 3-5 (1968); Diamond, supra note 3, at 318; Spector &
Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of Evidence Suscep-
tible?, 38 OMO ST. L.J. 567 (1977).
16. See generally Note, Hypotis-M Suggestibility and the Law, 31 NEB. L. REv. 575
(1952) (demonstrating the early views of hypnosis in the law).
17. 117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897).
18. Id. at 665, 49 P. at 1053.
19. Even today courts uniformly exclude statements made while under hypnosis.
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the earliest known case to actually consider the effect of pretrial
hypnosis on witness testimony and in Exum, the repressive view
reflected in Ebanks was relaxed somewhat. Although the Exum
court recognized that the source of the power of hypnosis and the
extent of its influence were, for the most part, unknown, it viewed
the evidence of hypnosis as only affecting the credibility of the wit-
ness and allowed her to testify.21
These early cases were followed by a long period with very little
case law on hypnosis reported.22 This period of inactivity finally
drew to a close in the 1950's when decisions on hypnosis began to
occur with greater frequency.23 However, it was not until 1968 that
a reported case again dealt with the effect of pretrial hypnosis on
witness competency. In 1968, Harding v. State,24 the watershed
case on the admissibility of hypnotically influenced testimony,
specifically addressed the issue.
In Harding, a young women was shot, and later, raped. Unable
to recall anything after the shooting, the victim was hypnotized to
enhance her recollection of the events following the shooting.
While under hypnosis, she gave a detailed account of those events
and named the defendant Harding as her assailant. She repeated
this account in court from her hypnotically refreshed memory.
The court held that this testimony was admissible since the victim
had testified from her own recollection. The fact that her recollec-
tion had been achieved in part by hypnosis was viewed as only
affecting the weight given to her testimony by the trier of fact.25
The sufficiency of the victim's testimony to support a guilty ver-
dict was viewed as a separate inquiry in Harding. The testimony
of the hypnotist regarding the procedure of hypnosis and its effect
See, e.g., Shockey v. State, 333 So. 2d 33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied 345
So. 2d 247 (Fla. 1976); Emmett v. State, 232 Ga. 110, 205 S.E.2d 231 (1974); Peo-
ple v. Hangsleben, 86 Mich. App. 718,273 N.W.2d 539 (1978); State v. Pusch, 77
N.D. 860,46 N.W.2d 508 (1951); State v. Harris, 241 Or. 224, 405 P.2d 492 (1965);
Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974). These deci-
sions rest in part on the hearsay nature of such testimony, but also reflect the
mistrust of any hypnotic evidence.
20. 138 N.C. 476, 50 S.E. 283 (1905).
21. Id. at 484, 50 S.E. at 286. But cf. Austin v. Barker, 110 A.D. 510, 96 N.Y.S. 814
(1906) (finding that testimony of the previously hypnotized witness alone
was insufficient to sustain a verdict for plaintiff).
22. Only one reported American case between 1915 and 1950 involved any aspect
of hypnosis. Spector & Foster, supra note 15, at 579 n.67.
23. See, e.g., Cornell v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959) (held
defendant has a right to employ hypnotist in his defense); People v. Marsh,
170 Cal. App. 2d 284, 338 P.2d 495 (1959) (court refused defense request to
have defendant testify under hypnosis).
24. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
25. Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
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on the witness was carefully examined 26 in order to assess the reli-
ability of the witness' testimony. The victim's account of the hyp-
notic session was also scrutinized. The court finally concluded
that in light of the hypnotist's opinion that the victim's testimony
was reliable and the fact that her testimony was corroborated on
several points, the hypnotically refreshed testimony was sufficient
to support a jury verdict of guilty.27
Harding was followed by numerous cases which adopted its po-
sition of complete admissibility. 28 In the federal courts, the admis-
sibility of hypnotically influenced testimony became so well-
established that it was no longer necessary to provide a foundation
concerning the nature and effect of hypnosis.29 Hypnosis was
viewed as affecting only the credibility, not admissibility, of testi-
mony. This further increased the use, and occasionally the
abuse,3 0 of hypnosis in criminal investigation. Eventually, how-
ever, the trend toward the acceptance of hypnosis in the criminal
process began to change as a substantial controversy arose within
the scientific community as to the reliability of hypnotically influ-
enced testimony.3 ' Cases began to go the other way on the issue
and hold such testimony inadmissible. 32
26. The psychologist who had hypnotized the witness in Harding explained the
process of hypnosis and the general procedures he had used in that particu-
lar case. In doing so he discounted the possibility of undue influence and
stated that in this case he felt the information recovered by hypnosis was
reliable. The court gave great weight to these reassurances in reaching its
decision to admit the testimony. Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 247, 246
A.2d 302, 312 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
27. Id. The court also noted that medical science had begun to recognize the
value of hypnosis as a means to restore memory.
28. See supra note 4.
29. United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885
(1979) (holding that since hypnotically refreshed evidence is admissible,
there was no need for the establishment of foundation regarding the nature
and effects of hypnosis).
30. Police officers and other law enforcement personnel with little training in
hypnosis, and with even less understanding of the effects of hypnosis on the
human mind, have been hypnotizing witnesses themselves in the course of
criminal investigations. Their lack of training and obvious bias has become a
source of concern to professionals in the field of hypnosis. See, Resolution by
the International Society of Hypnosis, 27 INT'L J. CLuNicAL & EXPERIMENTAL
HYPNOSIS 453 (1979); Resolution by the Society of Experimental Hypnosis, 27
INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNosis 452 (1979).
31. See Diamond, supra note 3; Hilgard & Loftus, Effective Interrogation of the
Eyewitness, 27 INT'L J. CLI UcAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOsiS 342 (1979); Orne,
The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 INT'L J. CLnIcAL & EXPERIMEN-
TAL HYPNOsIs 311 (1979) (suggesting minimal safeguards if hypnotically en-
hanced recall is to be used in court); Putnam, Hypnosis and Distortions in
Eyewitness Memory, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 437
(1979).
32. See supra note 6.
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The primary line of demarcation between those post-Harding
cases which hold hypnotically influenced testimony admissible
and those which hold it inadmissible is the Frye test.33 The Frye
test is basically a rule which requires that a scientific procedure or
technique must have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs before testimony as to the results of that
procedure is admissible in court.3 4 Although this requirement of
scientific acceptance originated in considering the admissibility of
polygraph results, it has been applied to many other scientific tests
and procedures.3 5 Recently, a number of courts have applied the
Frye test to hypnosis, reasoning that hypnosis is employed in
much the same manner as the polygraph and therefore should be
judged by the same standards.36 For the most part, these courts
have found that hypnosis fails to satisfy the requirements of Frye
and therefore have refused to admit hypnotically influenced testi-
mony.37 In contrast, Harding and those cases adopting its ap-
proach generally do not even address the Frye test.3
The first major case to apply the Frye test of admissibility to
hypnotically influenced testimony was State v. Mack.39 The Min-
nesota court had previously utilized the Frye test in considering
33. The Frye test is a general test for the admissibility of scientific techniques
which originated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye
involved expert testimony based on the results of an early type of polygraph
test.
34. Frye held that before a court can admit expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the de-
duction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general ac-
ceptance in the field in which it belongs. Id. at 1014.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1981) (photograph
dating by mathematical and astronomical calculations); United States v.
Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977) (ion microprobic analysis of human hair);
United States v. McDaniel, 538 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (spectrographic voice
identification); Scales v. City Court, 122 Ariz. 231, 594 P.2d 97 (1979)
(breathalyzer); People v. Jones, 110 Misc. 2d 118, 443 N.Y.S.2d 551 (Dutchess
County Ct. 1981) (odontological identification of bite marks); State v. Wash-
ington, 52 Cal. 2d 636, 343 P.2d 343 P.2d 577 (1959) (truth serum); State ex tel.
Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971) (spectrograph voice
analysis); People v. Smith, 229 Kan. 47, 622 P.2d 986 (1981) (enzyme analysis
of blood); State v. Clawson, 270 S.E.2d 659 (W.Va. 1980) (hair analysis).
36. See supra note 6. Actually there is a crucial distinction between hypnosis
and polygraph tests which these courts have failed to note. See infra notes
110-11 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 6.
38. See supra note 4.
39. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980). In applying the Frye rule the court noted that
"[u]nder the Frye rule, the results of mechanical or scientific testing are not
admissible unless the testing has developed or improved to the point where
experts in the field widely share the view that the results are scientifically
reliable as accurate." Id. at 768.
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the admissibility of polygraph results4O and voiceprints4i and be-
lieved that the test was equally applicable in the context of hyp-
notically refreshed testimony. Upon applying the Frye test to such
testimony, the court concluded that hypnotic evidence failed to
meet the standard of reliability required by Frye .42
In reaching its decision of inadmissibility, the Mack court con-
sidered the testimony of five experts on hypnosis and memory re-
trieval who had testified in an omnibus hearing in the court
below.4 3 The testimony of those experts dealt primarily with the
content of memory revived by hypnosis and although they agreed
that hypnosis can produce accurate recall, several factors that may
reduce historical accuracy were also established. The court em-
phasized four such factors in its analysis. First, "a hypnotized sub-
ject is highly susceptible to suggestion, even that which is subtle
and unintended."44 Therefore, the subject's post-hypnosis mem-
ory might not be entirely his own recall.45 Second, expert testi-
mony also indicated a tendency on the part of hypnotized subjects
to fill any gaps in their memories with extraneous or fantasized
material rather than admit they "don't know."" This process,
called confabulation, further reduces the reliability of testimony
from a hypnotically refreshed memory.47 The third problem noted
40. State v. Wakefield, 263 N.W.2d 76 (Minn. 1978).
41. State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 hJinn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971).
42. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980).
43. Among the experts testifying in the Mack hearing was Martin T. Orne. Dr.
Orne is a foremost clinical and research expert on hypnosis. He is a profes-
sor of psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania, former editor-in-chief of
the Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis and has authored many
scientific publications on hypnosis (he is co-author of the article on hypnosis
in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA MACROPAEDIA 113 (15th ed. 1979)).
44. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980). The suggestibility aspect of
hypnosis is a universally acknowledged phenomenon of hypnosis. See, e.g.,
H. ARONS, HYPNOSIS IN CRmINAL INVESTIGATIONS 14-15 (1967); E. HIGARD,
supra note 15, at 9-10; Diamond, supra note 3, at 333; Spector & Foster, supra
note 15, at 570. In fact, some writers view hypnosis as being virtually synony-
mous with suggestibility. E. HIGARD, supra note 15, at 9-10. It is this high
degree of suggestibility which poses the most significant danger of abuse in
the use of hypnosis in criminal investigations. A hypnotist can easily supply
details and identities to a prospective witness and may even suggest re-
sponses by the tone of voice used or the manner in which a question is
phrased. Diamond, supra note 3, at 333; Comment, The Probative Value of
Testimony From the Hypnotically Refreshed Recollection, 14 AKRON L. REV.
609, 624-25 (1981). See also Hilgard & Loftus, supra note 31 (stressing that the
precise wording of questions has a great impact on the answer of any witness
and noting that hypnotized subjects are particularly susceptible to leading
questions).
45. See supra note 44.
46. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980). See supra note 44.
47. Confabulation is another generally recognized aspect of hypnosis. See, e.g.,
Diamond, supra note 3, at 335; Dilloff, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Influ-
[Vol. 62:336
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was the inability to determine which parts of the hypnotically re-
freshed memory are accurate and which parts are the product of
suggestion, confabulation, or outright lies.48 Finally, "a memory
produced under hypnosis becomes hardened in the subject's
mind"49 to such an extent that cross-examination is no longer an
adequate means of testing reliability.50 The agreement of the ex-
perts on the combination of these factors convinced the Mack
court that hypnotically influenced memories were not scientifically
reliable as accurate and thus failed the Frye test.
The final holding of Mack is that "a witness whose memory has
been revived under hypnosis ordinarily must not be permitted to
testify to matters which he or she remembered under hypnosis."Sl
The court, however, made it clear that its decision was not meant
to foreclose the use of hypnosis as an investigative tool, noting that
facts obtained from a witness through hypnosis may provide valua-
ble leads to the solution of a crime.52
Several courts have recently adopted the reasoning of Mack
and reached substantially similar holdings.5 3 Indeed, the rule of
Mack appears to be the current trend. The most significant of
these recent decisions is Collins v. State.54 Collins, a decision re-
versing the position the same court had taken in Harding, adopted
the Frye test and held hypnotically influenced testimony inadmis-
sible. Collins thus destroys the very foundation of those cases that
enced Testimony, 4 OHio N.U.L. Rav. 1, 5 (1977); Orne, supra note 31, at 317-18;
Comment, supra note 44, at 619. Through this process the hypnotized subject
fills in the gaps in his memory with predominantly fantasized material. See
infra text accompanying note 89. Motivation to confabulate is attributable in
part to a desire to please the hypnotist and in part in response to the sugges-
tion that the subject remember the event completely.
48. Most authorities agree that 'there is no way, however, by which anyone-
even a psychologist or psychiatrist with extensive training in the field of hyp-
nosis-can for any particular piece of information determine whether it is a
product of actual memory versus confabulation unless there is independent
verification." Orne, supra note 31, at 318. The same is true of those memories
that are the product of suggestion. Diamond, supra note 3, at 334. Not even
the subject can determine which is which. This makes an assessment of the
accuracy of hypnotically refreshed testimony virtually impossible.
49. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
50. The process of hypnosis resolves doubts and uncertainties in the mind of the
subject and adds significantly to his confidence in his recall. Diamond, supra
note 3, at 339. A person who was once unsure as to what he actually observed
may become quite confident of post-hypnotic memories. This phenomenon
hinders the effective cross-examination of the witness considerably and has
been the basis of constitutional arguments against the use of hypnotically
refreshed testimony. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
51. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 771 (Minn. 1980).
52. Id.
53. See supra note 6.
54. 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272 (1982).
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have viewed hypnosis as only affecting the credibility of wit-
nesses.55 The overruling of Harding may trigger further reversals
in those jurisdictions which have previously adhered to the Har-
ding approach and will undoubtedly have a substantial impact on
those courts considering the admissibility question for the first
time.56
There is a middle ground between the Mack rule of strict inad-
missibility and the Harding approach. This middle ground is ex-
emplified by the position adopted in State v. Hurd57 which neither
requires that hypnosis be generally accepted as a means of pro-
ducing historically accurate recall,5 8 nor allows automatic admissi-
bility. Instead, the Hurd court held that "hypnotically-induced
testimony may be admissible if the proponent can demonstrate
that the use of hypnosis in the particular case was a reasonably
reliable means of restoring memory comparable to normal recall in
its accuracy."59 The court recognized the generally accepted fac-
55. See s-upra note 4, for those cases following the Harding approach. The most
recent is Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982). In Chapman, decided
just a year ago, the majority completely ignored the Frye test and resolutely
followed the Harding line of cases, holding that evidence of hypnosis did not
affect the competency of the witness, only her credibility. The Wyoming
court's holding is particularly surprising in light of the change in attitudes
toward the use of hypnosis since the Harding decision.
56. Actually the demise of Harding was foreshadowed by Polk v. State, 48 Md.
App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (1981), in which the Maryland Court of Appeals de-
cided that the Frye test was applicable to hypnotically influenced testimony
but remanded the case to determine whether such testimony passed that
test.
57. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
58. The Hurd court agreed that hypnotically refreshed testimony must meet the
standard of acceptability for scientific evidence to be admissible in a criminal
trial, but formulated that standard as requiring that the scientific test have
"sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform and reasonably reliable results
and will contribute materially to the ascertainment of the truth." Id. at 536,
432 A.2d at 91 (quoting State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343,352,230 A.2d 384 (1967)). The
court then found that if conducted properly and used only in appropriate cir-
cumstances, hypnosis met that standard. Id. at 538, 432 A.2d at 92.
The most important distinction between the test applied in Hurd and the
test applied State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980), is that under the
Hurd version of the Frye test, scientific reliability as an indicator of truth was
not required of hypnosis. The court recognized that, unlike the polygraph or
truth serum, the purpose of hypnosis is not to obtain truth, but rather to re-
store memory. In light of this distinction the court reasoned that hypnosis is
sufficiently reliable if it is shown to yield recollections as accurate as those of
an ordinary witness. See infra note 61 and accompanying text. See also
Spector & Foster, supra note 15, at 584 (making the same distinction between
truth indicators and hypnosis and noting that even ordinary eyewitness testi-
mony is often factually inaccurate and unreliable).
59. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 538, 432 A.2d 86, 92 (1981).
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tors that contribute to the unreliability of hypnotic recall,60 but
reasoned that exclusion of hypnotically induced testimony as a
matter of law was unnecessarily broad. Further, the court believed
that such a holding would result in the exclusion of evidence just
as trustworthy as other eyewitness testimony commonly admitted
since even ordinary eyewitness accounts are not completely accu-
rate.6 ' To aid in determining whether hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony met this standard in a particular case,62 and to ensure a
minimum level of reliability, the court adopted a set of procedural
requirements 63 that must be complied with prior to the introduc-
tion of hypnotically refreshed testimony. Compliance with these
60. The problems noted by the court were: (1) extreme vulnerability to sugges-
tion; (2) loss of critical judgment and a corresponding increase in confidence;
and (3) the tendency to mix memories evoked under hypnosis with prior re-
call and the inability to tell which is which. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 539-40,
432 A.2d 86, 93 (1981).
61. Psychological research does reveal many of the same shortcomings in ordi-
nary eyewitness testimony, as found in hypnotically refreshed testimony.
See generally Hilgard & Loftus, supra note 31; Levine & Tapp, The Psychology
of Criminal Investigation, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1079 (1973); Loftus & Loftus, On
the Permanence of Stored Information in the Human Brain, 35 Am . PSYCHOL-
OGIST 409 (1980); Putnam, supra note 31.
62. The Hurd court envisioned a case-by-case determination of the reliability of
hypnotically refreshed testimony rather than deciding the matter only once
as was done in State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980), and the cases
which follow its approach. See supra note 6 for those cases following Mack.
This case-by-case analysis has been criticized by some courts as being a
waste of judicial resources while still failing to remove the dangers of hypnot-
ically refreshed testimony. See State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132
Ariz. 180, 208, 644 P.2d 1266, 1294 (1982); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 39-40,
641 P.2d 775, 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 255 (1982); People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich.
App. 145, 159, 310 N.W.2d 306, 313-14 (1981). See also State v. Palmer, 210 Neb.
206, 217, 313 N.W.2d 648, 654 (1981).
63. The procedural safeguards adopted in State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86
(1981), are based on those suggested by Martin T. Orne. See supra note 43 for
Dr. Orne's qualifications. The requirements are:
First, a psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in the use of hyp-
nosis must conduct the session ....
Second, the professional conducting the hypnotic session should
be independent of and not regularly employed by the prosecutor, in-
vestigator or defense.
Third, any information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement
personnel or the defense prior to the hypnotic session must be re-
corded, either in writing or in other suitable form ....
Fourth, before inducing hypnosis the hypnotist should obtain
from the subject a detailed description of the facts as the subject re-
members them ....
Fifth, all contacts between the hypnotist and the subject must be
recorded. This will establish a record of the preinduction interview,
the hypnotic session, and the post-hypnotic period, enabling a court
to determine what information or suggestions the witness may have
received ....
Sixth, only the hypnotist and the subject should be present dur-
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safeguards is intended to minimize the major factors that render
hypnotically influenced testimony unreliable and assist the trial
court in its determination of the reliability, and therefore the ad-
missibility, of the testimony.64
Several commentators 65 and courts6 6 have endorsed the safe-
guards set forth in Hurd and agree that hypnotically influenced
testimony should be admitted if compliance with such safeguards
is shown. Others argue that such an approach is impractical and
inadequate.67 Some courts have adopted even more extensive
safeguards in an effort to ensure reliability.68 The current trend,
however, remains one of per se inadmissibility with at least five
jurisdictions in 1982 alone speaking out strongly against the admis-
sibility of hypnotically influenced testimony.69 State v. Palmer7 0 is
in accord with this trend.
III. ANALYSIS OF STATE v. PALMER
The hypnotic sessions conducted in the Palmer investigation
were performed in such a manner that few jurisdictions would
ing any phase of the hypnotic session, including the prehypnotic test-
ing and the post hypnotic interview ....
Id. at 544-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97.
64. Compliance with the six procedural requirements, supra note 63, does not
ensure admissibility. The party seeking to introduce hypnotically refreshed
testimony must still demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the
testimony is reasonably likely to be accurate evidence. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J.
525, 546, 432 A.2d 86, 97 (1981). See supra note 58 for the standard of reliabil-
ity. In addition, even after it is shown that the testimony is admissible, the
opponent may still challenge the particular procedures followed in that case,
although he may not attempt to prove the general unreliability of hypnosis.
State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 543, 432 A.2d 86, 95 (1981).
65. See Comment, supra note 44, at 628-29; Note, Safeguards Against Suggestive-
ness: A Means for Admissibility of Hypno-Induced Testimony, 38 WAsi. &
LEE L. REV. 197, 211 (1981).
66. See State el rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180,210, 644 P.2d 1266, 1296
(1982) (suggesting that the Orne standards adopted in Hurd be followed
when using hypnosis in criminal investigations); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M.
682, 689, 643 P.2d 246, 253 (1981); State v. Long, 32 Wash. App. 732, -, 649 P.2d
845, 847 (1982).
67. See supra note 62.
68. See People v. Lewis, 103 Misc. 2d 881, 427 N.Y.S.2d 177 (N.Y. Trial Term 1980);
People v. McDowell, 103 Misc. 2d 831, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
69. The five jurisdictions that have recently decided that hypnotically influenced
testimony should be inadmissible are: Arizona (State ex rel. Collins v. Supe-
rior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982)); California (People v. Shirley, 31
Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982)); Indiana (Strong v. State, -
Ind. -, 935 N.E.2d 969 (1982)); Maryland (Collins v. State, 56 Md. App. 186,447
A.2d 1272 (1982)); and New York (People v. Hughes, 88 A.D.2d 17,452 N.Y.S.2d
929 (1982)).
70. 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981).
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have admitted the subsequent testimony of the witnesses in-
volved. The hypnotists were rank amateurs 1 and there is some
evidence of improper suggestion. 72 The testimony would have
been inadmissible even under the Hurd standards.73 The Ne-
braska Supreme Court, however, rejected the Hurd approach, find-
ing that deciding on a case-by-case basis whether hypnotically
refreshed memory was as accurate as normal recall would be virtu-
ally impossible.7 4 The court reasoned that the better rule was that
set forth in Mack.75
In discussing the Mack holding, the Palmer court noted that
Mack had applied to hypnosis the same test that the results of
mechanical and scientific testing are subject to: general accept-
ance by experts in the field that the results are scientifically relia-
ble as accurate.7 6 The court then went on to apply its own version
of the same test, holding as follows:
[U]ntil hypnosis gains acceptance to the point where experts in the field
widely share the view that memories are accurately improved without un-
due danger of distortion, delusion, or fantasy, a witness who has been pre-
viously questioned under hypnosis may not testify in a criminal
proceeding concerning the subject matter adduced at the pretrial hypnotic
interview. 77
This is quite clearly an application of the Frye test, but the court
did not refer to Frye at any point in the decision or even cite previ-
ous Nebraska decisions where a similar test was used.78 More sig-
nificantly, in applying a test of admissibility based upon scientific
71. The hypnotic sessions in Palmer were conducted by law enforcement person-
nel Neither of the hypnotists had any professional medical, psychiatric, or
psychological training. Their training in hypnosis consisted of a four-day
course taken just three months before the investigation began. Id. at 213-14,
313 N.W.2d at 653.
72. No statement was obtained from the subjects prior to hypnosis, but the ses-
sions were recorded. The expert for the defense, a psychiatrist who had spe-
cialized in hypnosis for 20 years, testified that portions of the interviews were
improperly suggestive. Id. See also Appellant's Brief at 27-28, State v.
Palmer, No. 82-548 (Neb. Oct. 22, 1982) (quoting unduly suggestive portions of
the hypnotic session). See .supra notes 12-13.
73. See supra note 63.
74. 210 Neb. 206, 217, 313 N.W.2d 648, 654 (1981). On the facts of Palmer the deci-
sion as to whether to admit the hypnotically refreshed testimony would have
been very simple under the Hurd analysis. The procedural requirements
adopted in Hurd, upra note 63, were not complied with and therefore the
testimony would have been automatically inadmissible.
75. 210 Neb. 206, 217, 313 N.W.2d 648,654 (1981).
76. 210 Neb. 206, 215, 313 N.W.2d 648, 653-54 (1981).
77. 210 Neb. 206, 218, 313 N.W.2d 648, 655 (1981).
78. Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949) (citing Frye and finding
that the polygraph had not yet received general scientific acceptance and
therefore was inadmissible). See State v. Steinmark, 195 Neb. 545,239 N.W.2d
495 (1976); Parker v. State, 164 Neb. 614, 83 N.W.2d 347 (1957).
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acceptance in the relevant field, the court failed to cite even one
scientific commentary on the reliability of hypnosis. 79 The court
merely noted that the expert who had testified in Mack had found
hypnosis unreliable as an "indicator of truth"80 and adopted the
same rule the Mack court had adopted upon hearing him testify-
per se inadmissibility. This shows a rather surprising lack of criti-
cal analysis considering the controversial nature of this issue.
The court cited Harding in passing merely to demonstrate what
it viewed as an illogical distinction between two lines of cases, one
of which admits the hypnotically induced testimony of
prosecutorial witnesses and another which excludes exculpatory
hypnotically induced testimony of criminal defendants.1 Green-
field v. Commonwealth8 2 was cited as an example of those cases
holding exculpatory hypnotically influenced testimony inadmissi-
ble. An examination of the facts of Greenfield reveals that the sup-
posedly illogical distinction based upon the exculpatory or
inculpatory nature of the testimony does not exist. Greenfield in-
volved an attempt by the defense to introduce the testimony of the
hypnotist concerning the contents of what the defendant had said
while under hypnosis.83 This type of hearsay hypnotic testimony
has been uniformly excluded for decades.8 4 That is not to say that
criminal defendants or defense witnesses who testify from hypnot-
ically refreshed memories are treated any differently than
prosecutorial witnesses hypnotized prior to trial.85 The relevant
distinction is the hearsay or nonhearsay nature of the testimony,
79. The closest the court came to examining expert opinion on hypnotically influ-
enced testimony was to note that "the authorities agree that the problem is
that hypnosis can create a memory of perceptions which did not previously
exist and therefore bring forth a 'memory' of events which were nonexistent"
before hypnosis. State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 214, 313 N.W.2d 648, 653 (1981).
The court went on to point out some additional problems with hypnotically
refreshed testimony but never did explain who "the authorities" were.
80. 210 Neb. 206, 217, 313 N.W.2d 648, 654 (1981).
81. This distinction, characterized as one "between hypnotically-induced testi-
mony offered by the defendant to exculpate and that offered by the prosecu-
tion to make its case" was first perceived in State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 771
(Minn. 1980). The Nebraska court simply adopted the Mack view, using al-
most the same language to describe the distinction. Careful analysis by the
court would have revealed that in fact there is no inconsistency between the
cases cited. See infra text accompanying notes 82-85.
82. 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974).
83. Id. at 715, 204 S.E.2d at 418.
84. See supra note 19.
85. A criminal defendant may even have a right to employ a hypnotist to help
him recall crucial events in his defense. In Cornell v. Superior Court, 52 Cal.
2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959), it was held to be an abuse of discretion to refuse to
permit a defendant to employ a hypnotist in this manner. Contra, State ex
rel. Sheppard v. Kohlentz, 174 Ohio St. 120, 187 N.E.2d 40 (1962).
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rather than whether the testimony is offered by the prosecution or
defense. The court's attempt to imply otherwise demonstrates yet
another flaw in the reasoning of the Palmer opinion.
Despite the analytical weaknesses of the decision, Palmer does
reach the correct conclusion as to the general reliability of hypno-
sis. If expert opinion had been examined, the court would have
found that most authorities do agree that memories retrieved by
hypnosis are often inaccurate and may be the product of sugges-
tion or confabulation.8 6 The mind is not a-videotape recorder that
can play back past events in precise detail.8 7 Instead, memory re-
trieval is a process of reconstruction and may be productive as well
as reproductive.8 8 The hypnotically refreshed memory may be a
mosaic of "(1) appropriate actual events, (2) entirely irrelevant ac-
tual events, (3) pure fantasy, and (4) fantasized details supplied to
make a logical whole."89 Details suggested by the hypnotist, either
knowingly or unknowingly, are also integrated into the "mem-
ory."90 It is also generally accepted that a person can willfully lie
under hypnosis.9 ' These factors and the inability to distinguish
between accurate memories and those which are the product of
suggestion, confabulation, or fabrication, 92 make hypnotically in-
fluenced testimony inherently unreliable and present substantial
dangers9 3 in its use as evidence in criminal prosecutions.
In addition to the unreliability of memories refreshed by hyp-
nosis, considerations invoked by the criminal process itself also
weigh against admitting hypnotically influenced testimony in crim-
86. See supra notes 44 & 47.
87. The "videotape recorder" or exact copy theory of memory is basically the be-
lief that everything a person observes is recorded on his memory perma-
nently. The key, under this theory, is just finding the mechanism to unlock
those memories. Many individuals who encourage the use of hypnosis in
criminal investigations support this theory. See, e.g.,H. ARONS, supra note 44,
at 34-38; W. BRYAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HYPNosIs 196-213 (1962); Reiser, supra
note 3. However, recent research by experts in the field has led them to reject
the "videotape recorder" theory. See Hilgard & Loftus, supra note 31. The
current view is that memory retrieval is more a process of reconstructing
past events and filling in any missing material. The resulting "memory," al-
though often accurate, may at times bear little resemblance to the past expe-
rience. Loftus & Loftus, supra note 61, at 413. See also People v. Shirley, 31
Cal. 3d 18, 57-62,, 641 P.2d 775, 798-801, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 267-79 (1982).
88. See supra note 87.
89. Diamond, supra note 3, at 335.
90. See supra note 44.
91. Spector & Foster, supra note 15, at 594, Comment, Hypnosis-Its Role and
Current Admissibility in the Criminal Law, 17 Wm rEr LrJ. 665, 670-71
(1981); Comment, supra note 44, at 617.
92. See supra note 48.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 120-24.
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inal proceedings. The sixth amendment9 4 provides that the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to confrontation, and vital to that right
is the right of cross-examination.9 5 Memories which have hard-
ened under hypnosis96 tend to frustrate the right of cross-examina-
tion. After the hypnotic session, defense counsel can no longer
cross-examine the memory of the witness that existed prior to hyp-
nosis and any uncertainty which may have been present cannot be
demonstrated to the jury to discredit the witness. Thus the use of
hypnosis has been analogized to the destruction of evidence by
some commentators. 97 And although many cases fail to deal with
the cross-examination aspect of the admissibility question, the In-
diana Supreme Court has stated that the inability to effectively
cross-examine alone is reason enough to exclude hypnotically in-
fluenced testimony.98
An additional constitutional problem arises when the pretrial
hypnotic session results in a subsequent in-court or out-of-court
identification of the defendant. The United States Supreme Court
has stated that identifications may be so unnecessarily suggestive
and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification as to violate
due process of law.99 Therefore, it must be shown that identifica-
tion testimony is reliable before it can be deemed admissible. 00 In
assessing reliability, the suggestiveness of the identification proce-
dure must be weighed against the factors set out in Neil v. Big-
gers'O' measuring the accuracy of identifications.10 2 Due to the
heightened suggestibility of hypnotized witnesses, 0 3 many identi-
fications made after a hypnotic session will fail to meet this stan-
94. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
95. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Smith v. Illnois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968)
(holding that the sixth amendment right of confrontation is applicable to the
states under the fourteenth amendment).
96. See supra note 50.
97. See Worthington, supra note 3, at 414.
98. Strong v. State, - Ind. -, 435 N.E.2d 969, 970 (1982). See also State v. Mena,
128 Ariz. 226, 232, 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 (1981) (holding that the barrier to cross-
examination raised by hypnosis required an exception to its statutory rule of
witness competency); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 105, 436 A.2d
170, 174 (1981).
99. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188
(1972); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
100. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
101. 409 U.S. 188 (1972). The factors to be considered include:
The opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the
crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness'
prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated
by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between
the crime and the confrontation.
Id. at 199-200.
102. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
103. See supra note 44.
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dard of reliability. At any rate, such identifications must be
carefully scrutinized under the Biggers factors. Exclusion might
not always be required but this is certainly an additional factor
which must be considered in making the final decision as to the
admissibility of hypnotically influenced testimony.104
All three of the factors discussed above, the inherent unreliabil-
ity of hypnotically refreshed memory, the inability to effectively
cross-examine the previously hypnotized witness, and the danger
of unduly suggestive identifications, combine to make hypnotically
influenced testimony unsuitable evidence for use in criminal trials
and thus support the holding of Palmer. However, the evidentiary
shortcomings of hypnotically influenced testimony were not the
determinative factor in the Palmer decision. Instead, the court in-
voked its own version of the Frye test and held that hypnotically
influenced testimony should be inadmissible because of the lack of
general scientific acceptance of the reliability of hypnosis as an
"indicator of truth."' 05 Although the end result is the same under
either approach, this application of a test of scientific acceptance,
rather than examining the testimony under ordinary evidentiary
standards, is the major defect in the reasoning of the Palmer deci-
sion, as well as other cases that apply the Frye test.
IV. SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS
A. The Evidentiary Approach
The Frye test should not be applied to hypnotically influenced
testimony. Frye was concerned with the admissibility of expert
testimony deduced from the results of a scientific technique,O6 not
the admissibility of eyewitness testimony.10 7 The Frye test is
clearly applicable in a situation where an expert is interpreting the
results of a scientific technique, for in order to assess the credibil-
ity of his testimony, "the thing from which his deduction is made
104. Although most courts recognize the danger of improper suggestion in pretrial
hypnosis, few have addressed the constitutional aspect of this problem. The
issue was raised in State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A 2d 86 (1981), but it was not
a factor in the decision. The court did note, however, that in most cases iden-
tification testimony which meets the standard of admissibility set for all hyp-
notically refreshed testimony, see supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text,
would not violate due process. Id. at 548, 432 A.2d at 98.
105. State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 217, 313 N.W.2d 648, 655 (1981).
106. See supra note 34.
107. A few commentators have recognized that the Frye test is not directly appli-
cable to eyewitness testimony. See Comment, supra note 44, at 615; Note, The
Admissibility of Testimony Influenced by Hypnosis, 67 VA. I. Rsv. 1203, 1217-
18 (1981). This has also been judicially noticed. See People v. Hughes, 88
A.D.2d 17, 22-23, 452 N.Y.S.2d 929, 933 (1982) (Doerr, J., dissenting); State v.
McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 122, 244 S.E.2d 414, 429 (1978).
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must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the field in which it belongs."10 8 The focus in such a situation is
necessarily on the reliability of the underlying technique. In con-
trast, when considering the admissibility of eyewitness testimony,
even though influenced by pretrial hypnosis, the relevant issue is
the witness' knowledge of the events in question. The use of hyp-
nosis does bear on the reliability of that knowledge but only affects
the evidentiary value of the witness' testimony. Admissibility still
must turn on the reliability of the testimony rather than the relia-
bility of hypnosis.
In fact, the applicability of the Frye test to any aspect of hypno-
sis is questionable. 09 Hypnosis is conceptually different than
other scientific techniques the Frye test has been applied to, such
as the polygraph and voice-analysis.11 0 Hypnosis is not meant to
be an indicator of truth or a truth elicitor. Its purpose when used
in criminal investigations is to enhance memory and aid recall. It
is not expected to give infallible results"1 and should not be judg-
ed by a standard that demands such results. In criminal trials the
finder of fact must remain the ultimate truth elicitor and the only
question is whether hypnotically influenced testimony is evidence
of sufficient competency to aid in that function.
Hypnotically influenced testimony should be treated just like
any other eyewitness testimony. Rule 601112 of the Nebraska Rules
of Evidence provides that every person is competent to be a wit-
108. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923).
109. In McCoRMIcK ON EVIDENCE § 203 (2d ed. 1972), it is argued that the Frye test
should be discarded entirely. "General scientific acceptance is a proper con-
dition for taking notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admissi-
bility of scientific evidence." Id. at 491. Scientific evidence should be
received unless its admission creates evidentiary dangers such as undue
prejudice, misleading the jury, or excessive consumption of time. This ap-
proach does have merit in that it would allow more flexibility in utilizing sci-
entific advances and is more compatible with the statutory Rules of Evidence.
See infra text accompanying notes 112-19.
110. There is a crucial distinction between the use of hypnosis as a means of en-
hancing the recollection of a witness and the use of the polygraph or narco-
analysis. The latter are generally used to demonstrate the subject is lying or
to extract the truth. That has never been the goal of hypnosis. Its purpose is
to revive the witness' memory or to sharpen recall. Therefore, testing the
reliability of hypnosis as a means of finding the truth is inappropriate. Only a
few courts have recognized this distinction. See State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 537,
432 A.2d 86,92 (1981); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 687-88, 643 P.2d 246,251-52
(1981).
111. The primary use of hypnosis is as a therapeutic tool and for that purpose it
need not produce historically accurate memory. Thus the accuracy of memo-
ries adduced under hypnosis is generally not a subject of concern among
those who use it most. See State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980).
112. NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-601 (1979); See FED. R. Evm. 601.
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ness unless otherwise provided. Rule 602113 limits this presump-
tion of competency by requiring that the witness have personal
knowledge of the subject,114 but nowhere is hypnosis listed as a
factor rendering a witness incompetent." 5 Furthermore, under
rule 402116 all relevant evidence is admissible. Therefore, if rele-
vant, the hypnotically influenced testimony of any witness must at
least initially be presumed to be admissible. However, rule 403117
may lead to a different conclusion. Under rule 403, "evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mislead-
ing the jury... ."118 The key determination therefore is whether
the probative value of hypnotically influenced testimony is sub-
stantially outweighed by the dangers of its use in court.119
The probative value of hypnotically influenced testimony is
doubtful due to its questionable accuracy. The dangers of admit-
ting such testimony at trial are numerous. A substantial danger of
misleading the jury is present since the memory of the witness tes-
ti:ying might not be historically accurate.120 It is also feared that
juries may give excessive weight to hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony as a result of misconceptions which exist as to the utility of
hypnosis as a truth indicator.121 The suggestibility aspect of hyp-
nosis presents the danger that the hypnotically influenced testi-
113. NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-602 (1979); See FED. R. EvED. 602.
114. There may be some question as to the extent of the previously hypnotized
witness' personal knowledge due to the danger of suggestion. See supra note
44.
115. It is possible to provide special rules of competency for hypnotized witnesses
statutorily. Oregon has done just that. See OB. REv. STAT. § 136.675-.695
(1979) (The statute sets prerequisites to the use of testimony at trial and re-
quires informed consent by those subjected to hypnosis. Evidence obtained
in violation of the statute is inadmissible.).
116. NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-402 (1979); See FED. 1L EviD. 402.
117. NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-403 (1979); See FED. R. EviD. 403.
118. Id.
119. A balancing test to determine the admissibility of hypnotically influenced
testimony similar to rule 403 has been suggested by a few commentators in
the past. See Comment, supra note 44, at 616; Note, supra note 107, at 1220. It
is also the procedure which was utilized in State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 691,
643 P.2d 246, 255 (1981).
120. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
121. Laymen commonly associate great credibility with the technique of hypnosis.
See Dilloff, supra note 47, at 9; Comment, supra note 91, at 673-75. This is in
part due to the misconception that a hypnotized person "cannot tell a lie" and
partly due to the convincing nature of testimony from a previously hypno-
tized witness. This phenomenon is common to results achieved through the
aid of many scientific processes and has caused much concern in that it may
interfere with the jury's ability to evaluate credibility. See Spector & Foster,
supra note 15, at 595.
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mony may be unfairly prejudiced.122 Although additional rule 403
considerations might be listed, it is already clear that the dangers
in admitting hypnotically influenced testimony substantially out-
weigh its minimal probative value. Even when safeguards which
may reduce the danger of suggestions are implemented,123 the pro-
bative value of the testimony remains slight due to the possibility
of confabulation and fabrication. Thus, the balance must still be
struck on the side of exclusion. This is particularly true when the
constitutional problems previously discussed124 are added to the
equation.
Thus, the testimony of witnesses hypnotized prior to trial falls
short of the standard of admissibility set forth in the Rules of Evi-
dence. Although this conclusion yields the same result as that
reached in applying the Frye test, the evidentiary approach is
much more sound. Hypnotically induced testimony is still eyewit-
ness testimony and it should be analyzed within the evidentiary
framework designed to guide such an analysis rather than merely
adopting another jurisdiction's rule of inadmissibility based on a
test of questionable applicability. 25 The Rules of Evidence also
allow more flexibility. It may be that in the future hypnotic tech-
niques will advance to the point where memories refreshed by
hypnosis will be substantially more reliable. The probative value
of hypnotically refreshed testimony may no longer be outweighed
by the dangers in admitting it. A trial court could then admit the
testimony without waiting for a uniform consensus of scientific
opinion. For the time being, however, it appears that courts may
conclude as a matter of course that hypnotically influenced testi-
mony is inadmissible due to rule 403 considerations.
B. The Extent of Witness Incompetency
A final criticism and suggested revision of the Palmer decision
regards the extent of witness incompetency. The court held that a
previously hypnotized witness "may not testify in a criminal pro-
ceeding concerning the subject matter adduced at the pretrial hyp-
notic interview." 26 But, as the concurrence pointed out, "the term
subject matter is not defined."127 The district court on remand and
122. See supra note 44.
123. The most commonly suggested safeguards are those adopted in State v.
Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). See supra note 63.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 94-104.
125. Actually, it is not clear how the court can avoid using the evidentiary ap-
proach. NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-101 (1979) provides that the Rules of Evidence
govern proceedings in all courts in the State of Nebraska.
126. State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 218, 313 N.W.2d 648, 655 (1981).




the other courts which will attempt to interpret the Palmer deci-
sion are given little guidance as to the extent to which a previously
hypnotized witness is to be restricted in testifying.12 8
Taken at face value, Palmer seems to hold that a witness who
has been hypnotized prior to trial is precluded from testifying to
any aspect of the subject matter covered in the pretrial hypnotic
session.12 9 If this is in fact the rule, Nebraska joins California' 3 0 as
one of the few jurisdictions to impose such a rule of complete in-
competency and in doing so goes too far. To prohibit a previously
hypnotized witness from testifying about any matter covered in
the pretrial hypnotic interview places a high cost on the use of
hypnosis and will inevitably put an end to its use in criminal inves-
tigations. Such a rule also excludes otherwise competent
evidence.
In People v. Shirley,13 ' the California Supreme Court also found
that hypnosis failed the Frye test and held that "the testimony of a
witness who has undergone hypnosis for the purpose of restoring
his memory of the events in issue is inadmissible as to all matters
relating to those events, from the time of the hypnotic session for-
ward."'132 The court reasoned that hypnosis contaminated the wit-
ness' memory to such an extent that this rule of strict
incompetency was absolutely required. However, questioning on
topics wholly unrelated to those covered in the hypnotic interview
is allowed. 3 3 Support for this position was found in the work of
Dr. Bernard L. Diamond 3 4 who is the originator of the contamina-
tion theory. The court also cited cases from other jurisdictions
which had imposed complete incompetency. 3 5 However, those
128. Justice Clinton, concurring, stated that in his view a witness should be al-
lowed to testify to those things remembered prior to and independently of
the hypnotic session if it could be reliably determined what that was. Id.
That is also the rule the trial court adopted on remand.
129. The court does say that "testimony as to other subjects may or may not be
admissible." State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 218, 313 N.W.2d 648, 655 (1981).
130. The California Supreme Court, in People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775,
181 Cal. Rptr. 242, (1982), held that a witness subjected to pretrial hypnosis is
incompetent to testify to related matters from the time of hypnosis forward.
131. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, (1982).
132. Id. at 66-67, 641 P.2d at 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
133. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 67, 641 P.2d 775, 805, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 273
(1982). The court also pointed out that it did not intend to foreclose the use of
hypnosis for purely investigative purposes. Such a rule of witness incompe-
tency, however, most assuredly does foreclose the use of hypnosis in criminal
investigation.
134. See Diamond, supra note 3. Professor Diamond is a professor of law at the
University of California, Berkeley, and a clinical professor of psychiatry at
the University of California, San Francisco.
135. The California court cited State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981),
and People v. Tait, 99 Mich. App. 19, 297 N.W.2d 853 (1980), as cases holding
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courts referred to in Shirley have now reversed their position on
this issue136 and they, along with the better-reasoned cases from
other jurisdictions, now reject a rule of complete incompetency.
The better rule is that hypnosis does not render the witness in-
competent to testify to those facts that the witness was able to re-
call and relate prior to hypnosis even if those facts were the
subject of questioning in the hypnotic session. This is the position
recently adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court in State ex rel.
Collins v. Superior Court,l3 7 modifying the rule of total incompe-
tency of its prior decision on hypnotically influenced testimony.138
The Collins court did recognize that allowing witnesses to testify
as to prehypnotic memories still presents certain problems,139 but
reasoned that the benefit of admitting such testimony, and thereby
allowing the continued utilization of hypnosis as an investigatory
tool, outweighed the dangers. However, the court did require that
the party intending to offer the prehypnotic testimony must have
recorded the witness' prehypnotic recall and have the recordation
available at trial to assure that the testimony is limited to only
those facts previously recorded.140
The Collins approach to the issue of incompetency is clearly su-
perior to that of Palmer and Shirley. It is manifestly inconsistent
for a court to encourage or comment on the merits of the use of
hypnosis in criminal investigation and then adopt a rule of com-
plete witness incompetency. Law enforcement authorities cannot
justify jeopardizing an entire case by utilizing hypnosis, and thus
rendering a key witness incompetent, on the chance that new
leads might come from the session. The cost is too great even
though the use of hypnosis is often successful in obtaining leads
which aid in the solution of crimes.14' A rule of total incompetency
that pretrial hypnosis rendered a witness completely incompetent to testify
to those matters covered in the hypnotic sessions. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal.
3d. at 45-50, 641 P.2d at 790-93, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 258-62. Both Arizona and Michi-
gan have since abandoned this rule. See infra note 136.
136. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982); Peo-
ple v. Wallach, 110 Mich. App. 37, 312 N.W.2d 405 (1981).
137. 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982).
138. State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981), was Arizona's leading case
on hypnotically refreshed testimony until Collins.
139. The principal risk in allowing the witness to testify to those facts
remembered before hypnosis recognized by the court is that the witness'
heightened sense of confidence in his total recall after hypnosis will impair
cross-examination. 132 Ariz. at 210, 644 P.2d at 1296.
140. The witness' knowledge prior to hypnosis can be recorded in written, tape
recorded, or preferably, videotaped form. The court also suggested that
some, if not all, of the Orne standards, supra note 63, be adopted by parties
intending to use hypnosis for investigatory purposes. Id.
141. See generally E. BLOcK, HYPNosis: A NEW TOOL IN CRmIE DETECTION (1976);
Kroger & Douce, Hypnosis in Criminal Investigation, 27 INT'L J. CLUNICAL &
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effectively ends the use of hypnosis in criminal investigations.
That is a high cost for only a minimal amount of added protection
since the risks of allowing a witness to testify only to prehypnotic
recall are slight.
If a witness' testimony is strictly limited to prehypnotic recall,
most of the dangers which render hypnotically affected testimony
inadmissible are eliminated. The danger of improper suggestion
and confabulation are removed since only those facts demonstra-
bly recalled before hypnosis can be testified to. The Rules of Evi-
dence would also now allow the admission of such testimony, since
the rule 403142 considerations have been reversed. The probative
value of the testimony has increased and the dangers of mislead-
ing the jury and unfair prejudice have been reduced. The problem
of ineffective cross-examination still exists to some degree, but it
can be reduced by allowing the defendant to establish the-possibil-
ity that the witness is now more certain of events only tentatively
recalled before hypnosis. An indication of the certainty of the wit-
ness prior to hypnosis can be obtained by examining the required
prehypnotic recording. Remaining objections can be alleviated by
requiring that additional safeguards be complied with during any
hypnotic session.143
V. ADDENDUM
The Nebraska Supreme Court has now resolved any uncertanty
as to the extent of witness incompetency. In State v. Patterson,4 4
decided after this Note was written, the court said:
[A] Witness will not be rendered incompetent merely because he or she
was hypnotized during the investigatory stage of the case; rather, the wit-
ness will be permitted to testify with regard to those matters which he or
she was able to recall and relate prior to hypnosis, provided that there is
sufficient evidence to satisfy the court that the evidence was known and
related prior to hypnosis.14 5
Thus the court has adopted the position suggested in this Note and
taken by the district court on remand.14 6 This approach has merit
in that it protects the criminal process from truly unreliable evi-
EXPERmENTAL HypNosis 358 (1979) (describing cases in which hypnosis has
uncovered valuable leads).
142. NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-403 (1979); see FED. R. Evm. 403.
143. Compliance with the Orne safeguards, adopted in State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525,
432 A.2d 86 (1981), should be required when hypnosis is used for investigatory
purposes. For a list of safeguards from Dr. Orne himself and the reasoning
supporting them, see supra note 63.
144. 213 Neb. 686, - N.W.2d - (1983). See also State v. Levering, 213 Neb. 715, -
N.W.2d- (1983) (following the rule set forth in Patterson). See supra note 9.
145. 213 Neb. at 692, - N.W.2d at-.
146. See supra note 13.
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dence while preserving the opportunity to utilize hypnosis as an
investigatory tool in criminal cases. However, the Patterson deci-
sion stops short of rectifying the analytical shortcomings of
Palmer. The Nebraska Rules of Evidence are still not utilized in
the analysis of witness incompetency and there is no indication of
the means by which prehypnosis recall can be adequately
shown. 147 Adoption of the Hurd safeguards, 4 8 requiring recorda-
tion of prehypnotic recall, and basing the competency determina-
tion on the applicable Nebraska statutes,14 9 would have
strengthened Patterson considerably. Hopefully, the court will in-
corporate these factors into its analysis of hypnotically influenced
testimony at the earliest opportunity.
Mark A. Christensen '84
147. Instead of providing clear guidelines on how to demonstrate the existence of
prehypnotic recall the court said: "How the court is to be satisfied must be
determined on a case by case basis, and the authorities must therefore deter-
mine whether using hypnosis is worth the possible risk." 213 Neb. at 692, -
N.W.2d at -. Such a statement only invites more complicated decisions in
the future, when, by suggesting simple safeguards and procedures to be fol-
lowed in the use of hypnosis, the court could have clarified matters for courts
and investigators alike.
148. See supra note 63.
149. See supra notes 115-25 and accompanying text.
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